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ABSTRACT 
Recently, a host of propositions for guidelines for the ethical development and use of artificial intel-
ligence (AI) has been published. This body of work contains timely contributions for sensitizing de-
velopers to the ethical and societal implications of their work. However, a sustained embedding of 
ethics in largely algorithm-based technology development, research and studies requires a precise 
framing of the origins of the new vulnerabilities created. Recently, scholars have been referring to 
ethics associated with technology that is in some way “opaque” to at least part of its associated stake-
holders. This “opacity” can take several forms which will be discussed in this paper. There are various 
ways in which such an opacity can create vulnerabilities and, hence, relevant ethical, societal, epis-
temic and regulatory challenges. This paper provides a non-exhaustive list of examples in healthcare 
that call for educational resources and consideration in development processes that try to reveal and 
counter these opacities. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The field of “control engineering”—a field that 
is in an increasingly close connection to the field 
of “machine learning”—has been famously 
dubbed a “hidden technology” by Karl J. Åström 
in 1999. Åström, a remarkable pioneer in his 
science, characterized the field as mostly 
“hidden”, despite the fact that it solves novel 
problems humans are incapable of, is critical to 
a system’s successful operation and almost 
omnipresent. Application examples range from 
“generation and transmission of energy, process 
control, manufacturing, communication, 
transportation and entertainment” (Åström, 
1999). This perception has been reiterated as 
recently as on Sept. 21st, 2018, by Ian Craig in 
2018, in his presentation “Automatic control: 
The hidden technology that modern society can-
not live without”. Being a control scientist by 
trade myself, I have to admit that this almost 
romantic notion is not without appeal. However, 
as has been noted, automatic control can 
“'camouflage' system failure by controlling 
against the variable changes, so that trends do 
not become apparent until they are beyond 
control” (Bainbridge, 1983). Thus “hiddenness” 
or “opacity” must be a prime consideration in 
holistic system designs. In case the presence of 
some control algorithm acting on the system is 
not apparent at all, every chance to counteract 
may be lost. 
The field of “machine learning” constitutes a 
fundamental building brick of what is nowadays 
considered artificial intelligence (AI) and cannot 
be accused of being underreported even in main-
stream media outlets these days, see, e.g., 
Brennen, Howard and Nielsen, 2018. In terms of 
popularization, politics and economics, the gen-
eral existence of AI solutions is far from hidden, 
yet it may be, or bound to become, a “technol-
ogy that modern society cannot live without”. 
As such, many use-cases of AI can be catego-
rized as classification tasks and decision support 
systems, whereas this in turn can be viewed as 
the sensory input to human-in-the-loop control. 
In the future, some of these approaches may ex-
tend to fully automated decisions with a mere 
human supervision, e.g., in healthcare or auton-
omous driving (Topol, 2019). Since the range of 
applications of machine learning has been tre-
mendously enriched as compared to classical 
control engineering due to the ability to operate 
on largely unstructured data, it is the task of this 
paper to investigate ways in which opacity in 
machine learning and AI applications may yield 
potentially undesirable ethical, legal and socie-
tal implications (ELSI). 
The term “AI” is quickly changing and adapts to 
the current state of the art. From a scientific per-
spective, however, there is a need to identify 
sources of ELSI reliably in terms of a commonly 
understood und persisting taxonomy. One such 
potential class of sources has recently been dis-
cussed by means of the term “technological 
opacity”. As a contribution to the discussion, 
this paper aims at further refining the taxonomy 
of forms of technological opacity. An applica-
tion to the healthcare sector, a field in which ad-
verse effects are often among the most dramatic, 
is aimed at showcasing the applicability of the 
proposed refinement. 
The remainder is structured as follows: Section 
2 reviews literature on the forms of opacity 
found in algorithmic technology development. 
Section 3 proposes an extended, but concise list 
of forms of technological and techno-social 
opacities, while section 4 provides examples in 
healthcare and section 5 outlines proposals for 
remedies. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2 TECHNOLOGICAL 
OPACITY—A BRIEF REVIEW 
Technological opacity is a rather recent frame-
work to denote that long- and short-term effects, 
ways of interaction, interdependencies, the inner 
workings, an influence on one self’s or other’s 
actions or the very existence of some technology 
and its application remains hidden to some 
stakeholders. While this is an attempt at an all-
encompassing denomination, the literature does 
not seem to have converged to a common defi-
nition so far. 
For instance, Surden and Williams, 2016, define 
technological opacity in the following way: 
“[…]’technological opacity’ applies any 
time a technological system engages in be-
haviors that, while appropriate, may be hard 
to understand or predict, from the perspec-
tive of human users.” 
In their paper, the authors argue that autono-
mous vehicles will typically not conform to the 
average driver’s mental model about how other 
participants in traffic react. While they do as-
sume that autonomous driving will yield re-
duced rates of traffic accidents, they essentially 
call for technology developers and regulators to 
standardize the behavior of autonomous vehi-
cles. Considering a future, where autonomous 
vehicles abound, it might be meaningful not to 
restrict the afore-mentioned form of technologi-
cal opacity to concern only “human users”, as 
Surden and Williams do. If autonomous vehicles 
remain interconnected in ways that prevent a 
faultless prediction of future trajectories, this 
could also be denoted a technological opacity. 
In a completely different context, Endo, 2018, 
identifies technological opacity in “predictive 
coding”, which is machine learning used to as-
sess or predict the relevance of documents in 
law-suits. Predictive coding is advertised as a 
technological fix to make the assessment of 
large amounts of documents economically via-
ble, even in small-value claims and for parties 
with few resources. However, Endo argues that, 
currently, a lack of understanding of the technol-
ogy and the cost of hiring technological experts 
actually prevents parties with few financial re-
sources to make use of the technology. 
Pasquale, 2015, focusses on opaque algorithms 
used in finance and largely attributes its exist-
ence to corporate secrecy, or rather the fear to 
give away economic advantages and attempts to 
consolidate power. Topol, 2019, in turn, associ-
ates the intransparency of trained deep neural 
networks in healthcare—or more specifically, a 
lack of means to interpret how actual outputs are 
determined from input data—with the contro-
versy about “black box algorithms”. Topol re-
marks that the recognition of the existence of 
such algorithmic opacity has led to the incorpo-
ration of transparency requirements in the Euro-
pean Union’s General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR) as a prerequisite for practical de-
ployment. 
Vallor, 2016, introduces the term “techno-social 
opacity” which can be broadly referred to as the 
lack of understanding about the societal impli-
cations of specific technologies. While this re-
view remains non-exhaustive and limited to lit-
erature that actually uses the term “opacity”, the 
afore-mentioned references largely refer each to 
a single and specific form of opacity. In what 
follows, an attempt is made to distinguish be-
tween several forms with the aim to allow a sys-
tematic and holistic analysis of technological 
opacities ranging from opacity that is inten-
tional, opacity based on a lack of understanding 
or complexity, opacity based on a lack of per-
ception of societal effects over opacity from 
transdisciplinarity to procedural opacity. 
3 FORMS OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
OPACITY 
Burrell, 2016, provides a nuanced view on tech-
nological opacity with respect to algorithms and 
identifies three forms: (i) Opacity as intentional 
secrecy (attributed to Pasquale, 2015), (ii) opac-
ity as technical illiteracy and (iii) opacity from 
complexity as the mismatch between mathemat-
ical machine learning outputs and human ways 
of interpretation. 
The above forms of opacity address different 
stakeholders: While the first form is largely as-
sociated with active decisions on the part of the 
developing enterprise or intentional regulatory 
omissions, the second form is passive in the 
sense that it is associated with the fact that, e.g., 
the majority of the population is not capable to 
understand the intricacies of technological de-
velopment and its products, e.g., programming. 
Burrell disambiguates this form from the third, 
which also applies to proficient technology de-
velopers and elaborates that at the heart of the 
third form of opacity are (self-)learning algo-
rithms that may change the decision logic and 
operate on vast amounts of data. Such algo-
rithms hence incur complexity that results in al-
gorithmic outputs whose underlying rationale 
may be difficult to comprehend. Similarly, 
Matthias, 2004, observes that machine learning 
can yield algorithms, derived, e.g., by super-
vised learning, for which “the human trainer 
himself is unable to provide an algorithmic rep-
resentation.” Opacity arising from technologi-
cal complexity is also the apparent focus of Stahl 
and Coeckelbergh, 2016, who identify “ubiquity 
and pervasiveness”, “speed of innovation”, the 
“distributed and networked nature” and “logical 
malleability” (unforeseeable other use-cases) as 
novel challenges in information and communi-
cation technologies (ICT). Royakkers et al., 
2018, add that (self-)learning algorithms also 
challenge the mental models of users, which 
may fail to have a working anticipative notion of 
what a self-learning algorithm may do. 
Technology related to ‘Big Data’ are solutions 
that help analyze amounts of data that humans 
cannot handle (Mittelstadt and Floridi, 2016). 
With increasing computational resources, in 
some years’ time, ever larger amounts of data 
may not be difficult to analyze technologically, 
but whether the technology that was used to an-
alyze it is still humanly manageable is an issue 
of technological opacity resulting from com-
plexity. Unforeseeable use-cases and effects are 
also covered by Vallor, 2016, who has further 
introduced the notion of techno-social opacity, 
meaning the inadequacy of abilities to either 
predict adverse effects or to work towards de-
sired societal effects by means of technological 
innovation (or refraining from it). In the follow-
ing, I propose to append the list of forms of 
opacity by a fifth and sixth notion, which, in the 
sequel, will be argued to be distinct from the 
other notions by means of illustrating their rele-
vance in the healthcare context. The fifth form 
denotes opacity as a result of the 
transdisciplinary nature of applications and the 
complexity this incurs. This form is not specific 
to machine learning algorithms, while at the 
same time, I acknowledge that possibly the pri-
mary examples for such applications today stem 
from this field. To a large degree this is a result 
of the complexity incurred when the design of 
algorithms requires both in-depth mathematical 
and technical knowledge as well as application 
knowledge, e.g., proficiency in the medical sci-
ences. This form is distinct from techno-social 
opacity, in that the development team may boast 
a clear vision about what societal impact is de-
sired, but, e.g., fails to identify the relevant mo-
dalities, such as prevailing hospital workflows, 
lack of practitioner training, etc., that hinders 
their development in realizing this impact. 
A sixth and—for the purposes of this paper—fi-
nal form of opacity can be found in procedural 
opacity. While one might reasonably choose to 
consider this as part of broader, fourth and fifth 
forms, I argue that it is more appropriate to re-
serve yet another form of technological opacity 
associated with effects on behalf of a processes 
end-point, or “customer”. While this can be ar-
gued to not be strictly a form of technological 
opacity, I further argue that the achievements in 
machine learning and its endeavors in, e.g., ad-
ministrative automation, intertwine both pro-
cesses and technology in novel ways. For in-
stance, the above-mentioned example of predic-
tive coding may encompass this form of opacity 
if other parties in some law-suit are not even 
aware if, on which data sets and to which extent 
the technology has been applied (Endo, 2018). 
Procedural opacity in the technological sense 
may also always exist in situations where end-
customers, patients or any form of recipient re-
lying on some service has to trust that within the 
underlying technology-supported process (pos-
sibly unknown to her or him due to intentional 
secrecy) the responsible personnel did not suffer 
from too much technical illiteracy and the devel-
opment team had enough transdisciplinary com-
petence and kept technological complexity at a 
manageable level. In this sense, opacity 
resulting from faults in technology-driven pro-
cesses usually concerns the interaction of hu-
mans and technology, e.g., algorithmic decision 
support systems. It can be dismissed as being a 
meta-form aggregating other occurrences of 
technological opacity—however, it stimulates a 
holistic perspective on the involved processes 
and is hence useful for this reason. 
To summarize, it is proposed to distinguish the 
following forms of technological opacity: 
i. Opacity from intentional secrecy
ii. Opacity from technical illiteracy
iii. Opacity from technological complexity
iv. Opacity from techno-social interdependence
v. Opacity from application transdisciplinarity
vi. Opacity from technology-driven processes
This list may not be complete, but it will hope-
fully act as a structuring taxonomy for future 
discussions and will provide a frame for exam-
ples of technological opacity in healthcare. 
4 TECHNOLOGICAL OPACITY 
IN HEALTHCARE 
In what follows, a non-exhaustive overview is 
given about potential issues in healthcare that 
may arise due technological and techno-social 
opacity. This overview is intended to act as a 
stimulator to discussions, more in-depth anal-
yses and a means of sensitization for those unfa-
miliar with the context. In pointing out issues 
particular to novel machine learning algorithms 
applied in the healthcare context, the aim is to 
help development teams adequately realize the 
potential of machine learning solutions in 
healthcare, where it is an appropriate technolog-
ical fix (Sarewitz and Nelson, 2008). 
4.1 INFORMATIONAL POWER AND
MEDICAL DATA 
Information is power and producing information 
from data that would otherwise not be informa-
tive is an instrument of power. Such an instru-
ment requires regulation as it can lead to data 
processors having superior power over the 
subjects of the data (Mittelstadt et al., 2016). Es-
pecially in healthcare, data-driven medical tech-
nology, e.g., automated diagnosis tools, may po-
tentially shift the balance in terms of the author-
ity w.r.t. medical expertise from physicians to 
medical technology providers. In the extreme, 
the aggregation of diverse types and large 
amounts of information can drive humans out of 
the loop (Royakkers et al., 2018). This has also 
epistemic implications, elaborated on in section 
4.3. Without regulatory intervention, medical 
technology providers can consolidate their in-
formational power by applying algorithm se-
crecy as a means to intentionally generate opac-
ity. This may be largely considered an objection-
able transition as educational resources should 
be freely available and may amount to increased 
commercialization of medical knowledge, and 
hence a driver of increased inequality. 
Artificial intelligence tools might further pro-
vide the possibility for self-diagnosis. Here, it is 
highly probable that medical technology provid-
ers could try to prevent accidental diagnosis, 
e.g., by blocking access to the raw image mate-
rial in image-guided medical diagnosis systems,
for fear of being held morally obliged to provide
the technological means to diagnose everything.
What if the patient performing self-diagnosis ac-
tually observes something to diagnose from the
raw image material, but the device does not rec-
ognize it? This would result in unwanted bad
publicity and (a justified) loss in trust. Blocking
access to raw image material hence incurs opac-
ity both from, possibly unwarrantable, inten-
tional secrecy and from the process itself.
4.2 TECHNOLOGICAL ILLITERACY
Medical practice is multifaceted, subject to time 
pressure, and social and psychological nuances 
are highly relevant in making diagnoses. If elec-
trocardiographic pathology detection would fol-
low a set of simple rules, devoid of experience 
and objective guidelines that are easy to formal-
ize, deep learning would not be needed to auto-
mate it (Hannun et al., 2019). With the current 
load of knowledge that medical practitioners al-
ways need to have at their disposal, it is ques-
tionable how much in-depth understanding of 
the inner workings, e.g., of algorithmic decision 
support systems, can be reasonably expected. 
However, automated diagnosis support is ex-
pected to curb costs, improve on diagnosis qual-
ity and potentially even transfer healthcare to 
home care (Derrington, 2017). 
While patient compliance in medicine is an on-
going issue, it stands to reason that patients with 
varying degrees of technological illiteracy may 
show ‘consent fatigue’ (Royakkers et al., 2018), 
when confronted with algorithmic suggestions. 
Further, it may not be meaningful to require dis-
abled and impaired people (e.g., when suffering 
from dementia) to consent to technology that, 
e.g., monitors them (Royakkers et al., 2018) for 
lack of an understanding about the implications. 
Home care tools following the rationale of 
“technological paternalism” as a concept denot-
ing that “technology knows better what is good 
for us” may infringe upon personal autonomy, 
especially if performed without consent or 
knowledge of the user (Royakkers et al., 2018). 
For patients with sufficient mental capabilities, 
this can be potentially addressed by forms of tol-
erant paternalism (Floridi, 2015), a framework 
that intents to increase the level of knowledge 
and to provoke a more informed decision.
4.3 EPISTEMIC ISSUES 
Sometimes, AI evangelists propagate a vision of 
a utopian healthcare system, in which medical 
data can be securely shared under privacy regu-
lations and can be effectively used for a global-
ized, automated inference-based diagnosis. 
However unlikely (Topol, 2019), in a transition 
towards this vision, physicians would have to 
work cooperatively with medical diagnosis de-
vices and would need to understand the princi-
ples of the learning algorithms, be provided with 
transparent interfaces to be able to enter data 
with the appropriate quality and, hence, make 
use of automated diagnosis tools responsibly 
(Char, Shah and Magnus, 2018). These tools 
could rely on data that can be biased (most of the 
medical data is acquired in intensive care situa-
tions, which is often not representative), incom-
plete or out-of-date, facts that could not be ap-
parent to the medical practitioner, the develop-
ment team or service provider and, least of all, 
the patient. 
Furthermore, the apparent superiority of some 
AI systems in clinical trials (Hannun et al., 
2019; Topol, 2019) may lead doctors to refrain 
from questioning the validity of the computer 
models altogether and develop over-confidence 
in machine intelligence (Burrell, 2016). Practi-
tioners might not be able to take responsible ac-
tion, in particular, when the data presentation is 
overwhelming and poorly interpretable. The 
process of knowledge generation and preserva-
tion might become largely commercialized and 
potentially opaque to science or unavailable as 
educational resources. The distributed nature of 
medical data fusion and aggregation may further 
result in epistemic opacity. 
Similarly, economic pressures could lead to the 
early deployment of opaque AI-based solutions 
at the risk of significantly reducing life-saving 
accidental diagnoses, because the system’s fo-
cus may be too narrow and is promoted to work 
entirely without physician intervention. Data-
driven systems that are end-to-end, i.e., that aim 
at directly drawing actionable conclusions from 
largely unstructured data, potentially only imply 
a modeling process (defined as deriving a se-
mantic description of a system that is general-
izable to some other system to at least some ex-
tent), however, one which neither practitioner 
nor developer has fully specified and hence been 
able to investigate its implications. If a technol-
ogy’s applicability to real-world scenarios is im-
mediate, with little or no pre-processing of data 
and accessible tools, this can create the illusion 
of simplicity where this is actually not true. At 
the heart of this, there may be a conflation or 
confusion of causation and correlation (Lipton 
and Steinhardt, 2018). In complex applications, 
epistemic opacity at some level in the 
dependence structure from methodical experts, 
application experts, economic stakeholders to 
application subjects will create vulnerabilities 
that propagate, eventually affecting the patients 
directly. Clearly, errors can never be completely 
avoided, but it appears as though popular algo-
rithms in machine learning, such as deep learn-
ing, currently are susceptible to incorporating 
large epistemic gaps, i.e., a lack of scientific 
foundation in the modeling approach, that incurs 
opacity.  
4.4 TECHNO-SOCIAL
INTERDEPENDENCE 
Access to both medical data and expertise for 
training AI systems will become (or rather al-
ready is) a commodity, novel stakeholders can 
acquire, utilize and trade. The low running costs 
of machine-support lead to a strong potential to 
realize greater epistemic equality via access to 
intelligent decision support systems (on par with 
the skill of medical experts) by the less privi-
leged, e.g., for citizens of areas with lower den-
sity of healthcare professionals. But without 
proper considerations, AI-based decision sup-
port systems could be distributed unequally. 
There appears to be a high degree of uncertainty 
about whether either greater equality or inequal-
ity will come to pass using AI-based healthcare 
solutions (Topol, 2019). It becomes apparent, 
however, that an ever more wide-spread use of 
automated analysis of medical data could even-
tually force patients to consent to data sharing 
and opting-out of their rights to privacy, as oth-
erwise they cannot be sure to receive the same 
quality of treatment (Char, Shah and Magnus, 
2018). The fiduciary relationship between phy-
sician and patient may break entirely, potentially 
leaving patients without an adequate notion 
about the whereabouts of their data. 
4.5 APPLICATION
TRANSDISCIPLINARITY 
An explicit example that showcases the effects 
of inadequately addressing transdisciplinary 
issues in technology development can be ob-
served in many current use cases of electronic 
health records (EHR) in the United States. Stud-
ies have shown that current EHR systems have, 
in fact, increased the workload and stress of phy-
sicians (Gardner et al., 2019). An adequate 
transdisciplinary consideration of aspects of hu-
man-computer interaction, work psychology 
and knowledge aggregation can be a remedy. 
A further example on the intricacies of transdis-
ciplinary research is the automated drug delivery 
during anesthesia, which has largely relied on 
rather transparent dynamic pharmacokinetic 
model structures potentially augmented by in-
ference algorithms for individualizing the model 
to a specific patient (Neckebroek, De Smet and 
Struys, 2013). However, automated drug deliv-
ery is not yet fully realized. It is illustrative to 
compare the model semantics in papers written 
for technologists and physicians, which gives a 
hint on the difficulty to express mathematical 
expressions in, e.g., prose. This friction in trans-
disciplinary research cannot be avoided, but it is 
important to be sensitive to the mutual opacities 
of the partners in a development team. 
4.6 PROCEDURAL OPACITY 
At least initially, algorithmic decision support 
systems in healthcare, pathology detection algo-
rithms or diagnosis tools will most likely be de-
signed for a single or, at least, only a few multi-
ple use-cases. Effectively incorporating these 
tools into the medical workflow will be chal-
lenging and their limits need to be clear. If some 
pathology detection tool, e.g., on electrocardio-
graphs, is deployed only for specific detection 
tasks with the promise of curbing costs, it might, 
in fact, prevent the accidental diagnosis of other 
pathologies it is not designed for. On behalf of 
the patient, this incurs procedural opacity, be-
cause expectations might be to receive an all-en-
compassing treatment or diagnosis. Compart-
mentalization in the medical domain is already 
observable to thwart the full realization of this 
expectation. However, it is—for the most part—
sufficiently obvious for any patient to receive 
only specialized treatment. With automated and 
specialized diagnosis tools, further compart-
mentalization may yield further opacity. To 
counter this and at the same time provide an ac-
tual perspective in saving time for medical spe-
cialists, automated diagnosis technology should 
be designed as holistically as possible, which is 
more challenging to achieve than advertised. 
Char, Shah and Magnus, 2018, further warn that 
machine learning designers could be tempted to 
optimize for reimbursement rather than quality 
of care—a vision which lies at the intersection 
of opacity in processes and from complexity. 
5 POSSIBLE REMEDIES 
Within the literature, there is a range of remedies 
proposed to mitigate the effects of technological 
opacity. For instance, Andras et al., 2018, ask 
for natural language processing to provide ex-
planations for opaque machine learning applica-
tions. Explainable AI is a current research topic 
that can range from image highlighting to auto-
matically derive explanatory labels that shed 
light, e.g., on the rationale behind a classifica-
tion task. Explainable AI can provide an inward 
look into trained models post-hoc, but the suc-
cess of the training could remain trial and error 
and hence amounts to opacity from complexity 
on behalf of the developers. 
To mitigate complexity in (supervised) learning-
based algorithms and what is sometimes termed 
the “Reproducibility Crisis” of AI (Voosen, 
2017; Hutson, 2018), leading researchers de-
mand more rigor in neural network training 
(Sculley et al., 2014; Rahimi and Recht, 2017). 
So-called “black-box” modeling approaches are 
quite common in control theory, where it is con-
servatively applied. “Conservatively”, here re-
fers to specialized data pre-processing, highly 
structured input-output data, reflection on mod-
eling assumptions and structure as well as model 
verification and validation. In contrast, black-
box neural network-based modeling processes 
are difficult to be validated and it appears to be 
both one of the largest advantages and (epis-
temic) weaknesses about the technology that it 
can be applied to very unstructured data. 
Apart from technical remedies, non-technical 
solutions are required for all other technological 
opacities. Extending the application of “Respon-
sible Research and Innovation” (RRI) 
(Grunwald, 2011) may be a solution (Stahl and 
Coeckelbergh, 2016), in which a wide range of 
stakeholders need to cooperate closely. Further-
more, post-hoc analysis of cases, in which (as-
sumedly unintended) opacity yielded adverse ef-
fects, is necessary to answer essential questions, 
e.g., on the degree of necessary interdisciplinary
education of engineers. Driving factors of spe-
cialization and the complexity of the technology
will possibly set a limit, but an awareness for po-
tential opacity should be a minimum goal. Con-
sequently, there might be a need for a class of
engineers trained in RRI.
6 CONCLUSION 
The paper provided a non-exhaustive list of ex-
amples of technological opacities in healthcare, 
categorized into different forms and compiled 
with the purpose to illustrate the multi-faceted 
ways in which opacity can be generated by au-
tomation and machine learning. There exists no 
panacea that can act as a solution, but, it appears 
as though the variety of issues presented illus-
trate a need for transdisciplinary research teams 
to work on holistic approaches to machine learn-
ing and artificial intelligence solutions in 
healthcare that mix well with current workflows 
or improve them, circumvent a range of the 
above-mentioned adverse ethical, legal and so-
cietal implications and actually contribute to the 
improvement of the quality, equality and effec-
tiveness in healthcare. 
7 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The author would like to thank Vincent Müller 
for his feedback on the topic. 
8 REFERENCES 
1. Andras, P. et al. (2018) ‘Trusting Intelligent
Machines Deepening trust within socio-technical
systems’, IEEE Technology and Society Magazine.
IEEE, 37(december), pp. 76–83.
2. Åström, K. J. (1999) ‘Automatic Control - The
Hidden Technology’, in Frank, P. M. (ed.) Advances
in Control, pp. 1–28.
3. Bainbridge, L. (1983) ‘Ironies of Automation’,
Automatica, 19(6), pp. 775–779.
4. Brennen, A. J. S., Howard, P. N. and Nielsen, R. K.
(2018) ‘An Industry-Led Debate: How UK Media
Cover Artificial Intelligence’, Reuters Institute for
the Study of Journalism Fact Sheet, (December), pp.
1–10.
5. Burrell, J. (2016) ‘How the Machine “Thinks:”
Understanding Opacity in Machine Learning
Algorithms’, Big Data & Society, 3(1), pp. 1–12.
6. Char, D. S., Shah, N. H. and Magnus, D. (2018)
‘Implementing Machine Learning in Health Care’,
New England Journal of Medicine, 378(11), pp.
981–983.
7. Craig, I. (2018) ‘Automatic control: The hidden
technology that modern society cannot live without’.
University of the Witswatersrand, Johannesburg,
South Africa.
8. Derrington, D. (2017) Artificial Intelligence for
Health and Health Care, JASON Report. Available
at: https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/jsr-
17-task-002_aiforhealthandhealthcare12122017.pdf.
9. Endo, S. K. (2018) ‘Technological Opacity &
Procedural Injustice’, Boston College Law Review,
59 (forthcoming), pp. 821–876.
10. Floridi, L. (2015) ‘Tolerant Paternalism : Pro-ethical
Design as a Resolution of the Dilemma of
Toleration’, Science and Engineering Ethics.
Springer Netherlands.
11. Gardner, R. L. et al. (2019) ‘Physician stress and
burnout: the impact of health information
technology’, Journal of the American Medical
Informatics Association, 26(2), pp. 106–114.
12. Grunwald, A. (2011) ‘Responsible Innovation:
Bringing together Technology Assessment, Applied
Ethics, and STS Research’, Enterprise and Work
Innovation Studies, 7, pp. 9–31.
13. Hannun, A. Y. et al. (2019) ‘Cardiologist-level
arrhythmia detection and classification in
ambulatory electrocardiograms using a deep neural
network’, Nature Medicine, 25, pp. 65–69.
14. Hutson, M. (2018) ‘Artificial intelligence faces
reproducibility crisis’, Science, 359(6377), pp. 725–
726.
15. Lipton, Z. C. and Steinhardt, J. (2018) ‘Troubling
Trends in Machine Learning Scholarship’, pp. 1–15.
16. Matthias, A. (2004) ‘The responsibility gap:
Ascribing responsibility for the actions of learning
automata’, Ethics and Information Technology, 6,
pp. 175–183.
17. Neckebroek, M. M., De Smet, T. and Struys, M. M.
R. F. (2013) ‘Automated Drug Delivery in
Anesthesia’, Current Anesthesiology Reports, 3(1),
pp. 18–26.
18. Pasquale, F. (2015) The Black Box Society - The
Secret Algorithms That Control Money and
Information. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London,
England: Harvard University Press.
19. Rahimi, A. and Recht, B. (2017) Reflections on
Random Kitchen Sinks Back When We Were Kids,
arg min blog.
20. Royakkers, L. et al. (2018) ‘Societal and ethical
issues of digitization’, Ethics and Information
Technology. Springer Netherlands, 20(2), pp. 127–
142.
21. Sarewitz, D. and Nelson, R. (2008) ‘Three rules for
technological fixes’, Nature, 456(7224), pp. 871–
872.
22. Sculley, D. et al. (2014) ‘Machine learning: The
high-interest credit card of technical debt’, in
Proceedings from SE4ML: Software Engineering for
Machine Learning (NIPS 2014 Workshop).
23. Stahl, B. C. and Coeckelbergh, M. (2016) ‘Ethics of
healthcare robotics: Towards responsible research
and innovation’, Robotics and Autonomous
Systems. Elsevier B.V., 86, pp. 152–161.
24. Surden, H. and Williams, M.-A. (2016)
‘Technological Opacity, Predictability, and Self-
Driving Cars’, Cardozo Law Review, 38(121), pp.
121–181.
25. Topol, E. J. (2019) ‘High-performance medicine: the
convergence of human and artificial intelligence’,
Nature Medicine. Springer US, 25(1), pp. 44–56.
26. Vallor, S. (2016) Technology and the Virtues.
Oxford University Press.
27. Voosen, B. P. (2017) ‘The AI Detectives’, Science,
357(6346), pp. 22–27.
